Wednesday, November 30, 2011
ALSO BREAKING: Knoedler Closing ... Effective Immediately
Patricia Cohen has the story in the New York Times.
BREAKING: A little joy in Fiskville today (UPDATED)
Fisk University has won its appeal in the latest round of the Stieglitz Collection litigation. It gets to enter into a sharing arrangement with the Crystal Bridges Museum -- and doesn't have to set aside $20 million of the $30 million pricetag in a separate endowment. Story here. Background here. More later when I've had a chance to read the opinion.
UPDATE: I've now read through the opinions. The majority affirms the basic cy pres ruling, but holds that "the court exceeded its statutory authority ... when it decreed how the proceeds of sale would be spent": "The court has no authority ... to effectively decree the manner by which the Collection would be used by Fisk in furtherance of its educational mission." The dissent took more of a Donor Intent Police approach: to permit the University "to monetize the Collection ... in order to infuse much needed capital" would "convert[] the Collection into money, which is in direct conflict with Ms. O'Keeffe's expressed intent. The record clearly reveals that Ms. O'Keeffe never intended for the Collection to be sold or otherwise monetized in order for Fisk University to pay its general operating expenses." It was therefore permissible for the court to allow Fisk to keep $10 million -- so that it can "rise above its current financial predicament" -- but order the rest placed in a restricted endowment.
Speaking of the Donor Intent Police, Lee Rosenbaum calls Alice Walton a "donor-intent violator" and calls for the AAMD to "strongly exert its influence" on Crystal Bridges for its bad behavior in saving Fisk from bankruptcy and keeping the Stieglitz Collection in the public domain. But it's important to note that there's no way to preserve the donor's intent here. The trial court already found that "Fisk's financial situation rendered strict compliance with the conditions impracticable," that "due to Fisk's financial situation, it was impracticable for Fisk to comply with Ms. O'Keeffe's condition that the Collection be maintained at and displayed by Fisk." The question to be determined in the litigation was which option most "closely approximated Ms. O'Keeffe's charitable intent" ... and the answer was Alice Walton's:
"To address Ms. O'Keeffe's condition that the Collection be displayed intact, the [Crystal Bridges] Agreement provides that the Collection will be displayed at the institutions on a rotating basis so that it will be available on the Fisk campus during at least two years of each student's four year matriculation at Fisk. With respect to the maintenance and display conditions, the agreement ... charges that [the Collection] committee, when determining what is in the best interest of the Collection, 'to take into account the conditions originally set out by Georgia O'Keeffe ....' In accordance with the original conditions, no item of work included in the Collection may be sold or exchanged, no item of work may be added to the Collection, and the Collection will be known, in perpetuity, as the 'Alfred Stieglitz Collection.'"
So the Tennessee courts have ruled that, far from being a donor-intent violator, Walton is actually the closest donor-intent approximator in this case. I suppose reasonable minds could differ about that -- one could argue that one of the Attorney General's alternative proposals was actually closer to O'Keeffe's intent, as if there were some kind of ruler to measure the distance between these things -- but it would be exceedingly odd for the AAMD to "strongly exert its influence" on Crystal Bridges for doing what the courts have sanctioned as the closest possible substitute for the donor's intent.
UPDATE: I've now read through the opinions. The majority affirms the basic cy pres ruling, but holds that "the court exceeded its statutory authority ... when it decreed how the proceeds of sale would be spent": "The court has no authority ... to effectively decree the manner by which the Collection would be used by Fisk in furtherance of its educational mission." The dissent took more of a Donor Intent Police approach: to permit the University "to monetize the Collection ... in order to infuse much needed capital" would "convert[] the Collection into money, which is in direct conflict with Ms. O'Keeffe's expressed intent. The record clearly reveals that Ms. O'Keeffe never intended for the Collection to be sold or otherwise monetized in order for Fisk University to pay its general operating expenses." It was therefore permissible for the court to allow Fisk to keep $10 million -- so that it can "rise above its current financial predicament" -- but order the rest placed in a restricted endowment.
Speaking of the Donor Intent Police, Lee Rosenbaum calls Alice Walton a "donor-intent violator" and calls for the AAMD to "strongly exert its influence" on Crystal Bridges for its bad behavior in saving Fisk from bankruptcy and keeping the Stieglitz Collection in the public domain. But it's important to note that there's no way to preserve the donor's intent here. The trial court already found that "Fisk's financial situation rendered strict compliance with the conditions impracticable," that "due to Fisk's financial situation, it was impracticable for Fisk to comply with Ms. O'Keeffe's condition that the Collection be maintained at and displayed by Fisk." The question to be determined in the litigation was which option most "closely approximated Ms. O'Keeffe's charitable intent" ... and the answer was Alice Walton's:
"To address Ms. O'Keeffe's condition that the Collection be displayed intact, the [Crystal Bridges] Agreement provides that the Collection will be displayed at the institutions on a rotating basis so that it will be available on the Fisk campus during at least two years of each student's four year matriculation at Fisk. With respect to the maintenance and display conditions, the agreement ... charges that [the Collection] committee, when determining what is in the best interest of the Collection, 'to take into account the conditions originally set out by Georgia O'Keeffe ....' In accordance with the original conditions, no item of work included in the Collection may be sold or exchanged, no item of work may be added to the Collection, and the Collection will be known, in perpetuity, as the 'Alfred Stieglitz Collection.'"
So the Tennessee courts have ruled that, far from being a donor-intent violator, Walton is actually the closest donor-intent approximator in this case. I suppose reasonable minds could differ about that -- one could argue that one of the Attorney General's alternative proposals was actually closer to O'Keeffe's intent, as if there were some kind of ruler to measure the distance between these things -- but it would be exceedingly odd for the AAMD to "strongly exert its influence" on Crystal Bridges for doing what the courts have sanctioned as the closest possible substitute for the donor's intent.
Tuesday, November 29, 2011
What We Talk About When We Talk About Appropriation
Contemporary Art After Cariou v. Prince, a panel discussion at the City Bar Association, Dec. 13.
Show Me the CARFAC
Andrew Russeth notes that "a group that lobbies on behalf of Canadian artists is calling on the country’s government to enact a resale royalty law that would guarantee artists a five-percent cut when one of their artworks is resold."
Related posts here and here.
Related posts here and here.
Monday, November 28, 2011
"Overall, the three amicus briefs make a strong argument for—at the very least—a remand."
The Fordham Intellectual Property Law Journal on Prince-Cariou: "The Southern District decision was too narrow in its transformative use analysis, and too broad in its application of liability."
"The problematic charitable-donation tax deduction"
Felix Salmon wasn't impressed with Stephen Carter's recent piece on the virtues of the charitable deduction. The issue comes up in the context of his discussion of an article over the weekend in the New York Times on elements of Ronald Lauder's tax planning. Salmon's view is that "there is very little public policy served by giving Lauder [a tax deduction for transferring art to the museum he controls]. At the margin, does it make him more likely to open up a lovely museum of early 20th Century German and Austrian art in a Fifth Avenue mansion? Possibly. But the connection is tenuous enough that it’s hard to have any conviction in." Carter had argued that it is "silly" to "suppose that eliminating the deduction will have little effect on donations."
Friday, November 25, 2011
Wednesday, November 23, 2011
"One way to increase the value of your art would be to have it become part of an oddly popular/famous art theft."
The Art Market Monitor on one consequence of Mark Lugo's San Francisco Picasso theft.
Tuesday, November 22, 2011
"By encouraging individuals to make their own choices on how to spend money for the public good, the deduction makes society as a whole better off. Let’s keep it that way."
Stephen Carter pushes back against the "rising mania among politicians" to "either eliminat[e] or severely restrict[] the charitable deduction." It's interesting throughout. Among other things, he argues that it's "silly" to "suppose that eliminating the deduction will have little effect on donations":
"Consistent research over the years has shown that charitable giving ... is price-elastic, at least in the higher tax brackets, where giving disproportionately takes place. ... The price of a gift rises when the value of the deduction falls. If a taxpayer in the 35 percent bracket makes a $1,000 contribution, the 'price' is only $650, because of the $350 deduction. Should his deduction be capped at, say, half its nominal amount, then the deduction is only $175, and the 'price' rises to $825. Should the deduction be eliminated, then the price of the $1,000 contribution is $1,000. It is difficult to imagine a universe in which this rising price would have no effect on consumption of a good."
"Consistent research over the years has shown that charitable giving ... is price-elastic, at least in the higher tax brackets, where giving disproportionately takes place. ... The price of a gift rises when the value of the deduction falls. If a taxpayer in the 35 percent bracket makes a $1,000 contribution, the 'price' is only $650, because of the $350 deduction. Should his deduction be capped at, say, half its nominal amount, then the deduction is only $175, and the 'price' rises to $825. Should the deduction be eliminated, then the price of the $1,000 contribution is $1,000. It is difficult to imagine a universe in which this rising price would have no effect on consumption of a good."
"It’s an insult to the tree. It has nothing to do with urbanization."
In San Francisco, a spate of tagging that "appears to violate one of the tenets of the graffiti subculture."
Monday, November 21, 2011
"Federal judge tosses book at art swindler" (UPDATED)
Six years for Thomas Doyle. Background here.
UPDATE: More from the New York Times and Courthouse News Service.
UPDATE: More from the New York Times and Courthouse News Service.
Saturday, November 19, 2011
"I will take this to the bitter end with them."
Thursday, November 17, 2011
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